2013 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

5-1-2013

In Re: Cheryl Lucretia Springs

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013

Recommended Citation
"In Re: Cheryl Lucretia Springs " (2013). 2013 Decisions. 884.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013/884

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2013 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

BLD-192

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 13-1306
___________
In re: CHERYL LUCRETIA SPRINGS,
Debtor
CHERYL LUCRETIA SPRINGS,
Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. Civil No. 13-cv-00156)
District Judge: Honorable Sue L. Robinson
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
April 11, 2013

Before: SCIRICA, HARDIMAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: May 1, 2013)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
In June 2012, the Appellant, Cheryl Lucretia Springs, filed for protection under
Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. During the course of the bankruptcy

proceedings, Springs’s landlord requested relief from the automatic stay in order to
commence eviction proceedings against her in state court. The Bankruptcy Court granted
the landlord’s motion. In December 2012, the Bankruptcy Court dismissed Springs’s
Chapter 7 case. She did not appeal from the order.
Approximately two weeks later, in January 2013, Springs filed a second Chapter 7
case. Following a hearing, the Bankruptcy Court dismissed this second case on the
ground that, inter alia, “the sole purpose behind commencing this case was to hinder and
frustrate the exercise of the Landlord’s legal remedies.” Springs appealed this order to
the United States District Court for the District of Delaware.
While the appeal was pending in the District Court, Springs filed an emergency
motion to stay the eviction proceedings, arguing that she and her family had nowhere else
to live. The District Court denied Springs’s motion on the grounds that she had not
provided any information about the status of the eviction proceedings, and had not
demonstrated that she would prevail on the merits of her appeal. Springs now appeals
from the District Court’s order. 1

1

We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1292(a)(1) and
158(d)(1).
2

The District Court considered the following factors to determine whether to issue a
stay in this case: (1) whether Springs made a strong showing that she was likely to
succeed on the merits of her appeal; (2) whether she would be irreparably injured absent
a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay would substantially injure the other parties; and
(4) where the public interest lies. See Republic of Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 949 F.2d 653, 658 (3d Cir. 1991). We agree with the District Court that these
factors weighed against granting a stay. While Springs stated in her motion that the
Bankruptcy Court’s underlying decision to dismiss her second Chapter 7 case was
“harsh,” she did not point to any specific error in that decision. In fact, she did not
challenge any of the Bankruptcy Court’s findings of fact or conclusions of law.
Furthermore, she did not provide the District Court with any information about the status
of the state court eviction proceedings, or indicate whether any legal remedies were
available to her there. Under these circumstances, the District Court did not err in
denying her request for a stay.
In the document that Springs filed in support of her appeal, she asks this Court to
“reopen” and “discharge” her bankruptcy case. We note, however, that her appeal from
the Bankruptcy Court’s ruling is still pending in the District Court, and the only matter
presently before us is the District Court’s order denying her motion to stay the eviction
proceedings. Therefore, we will not consider her request.
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For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that there is no substantial question
presented by this appeal. Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s
order. See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
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